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INTRODUCTION: A TALE OF (AT LEAST)
TWO FEDERALISMS
DENISE C. MORGAN*
These are the best of times and the worst of times to be writing
about federalism. Over the past fifteen years, the U.S. Supreme
Court has breathed life into what appeared to be a moribund, abstract, technical area of law. Federalism has become relevant and
everyone has something to say about the proper balance of power
between the federal and state governments. Improbable as it may
seem, suddenly it is cool to be a federal-courts junkie.1
But the sexiness of the new federalism has come at the price of
confusion and instability. Everything about the area of law now
seems to be in flux. The most obvious example is that the composition of the Supreme Court is changing for the first time in eleven
years — gone are both Chief Justice William Rehnquist, who played
a strong leadership role in the Court’s federalism cases, and Justice
Sandra Day O’Connor, another consistent member of the States’
Rights Five.2 We can only speculate about the positions their
replacements will take in future federalism cases and how the interplay of new personalities and judicial styles on the Court will affect
the work of the Justices. Chief Justice John Roberts’s dissenting
opinion in Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, written when he was a circuit
court judge, suggests that he is willing to read Supreme Court precedent narrowing Congress’s Commerce Clause powers and ex* Professor, New York Law School, 1995-2006. Thanks to Cameron Stracher for
reading and commenting on this essay; and to Ledan Chen ‘06 and Riki King ‘06 for
their attentive research assistance.
1. See Jeffrey Toobin, The Bench: Scotus Watch, THE NEW YORKER, Nov. 21, 2005, at
44 (discussing the popular blog “Underneath Their Robes,” which was authored under
the pen name Article III Groupie); Adam Liptak, Mystery of Gossipy Blog on the Judiciary Is
Solved, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2005, at A14 (same).
2. The States’ Rights Five are the late Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Anthony Kennedy, Sandra Day O’Connor, Antonin Scalia, and Clarence Thomas. See
Lynn A. Baker, The Future of Federalism?: Pierce County v. Guillen as a Case Study, 50
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 699, 700, n.4 (2005-2006); Editorial, Fiddling with Federalism, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 15, 1999, at A34 (referring to the “states’ rights five”).
615
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panding facial challenges to federal statutes broadly.3 Then-Judge
Roberts, however, also allowed that he would be open to find “alternative grounds for sustaining application of [Commerce Clause
statutes] that [would] be more consistent with Supreme Court precedent.”4 Harriet Miers, President George W. Bush’s next pick to
fill a Supreme Court seat, had no record that would betray her leanings in federalism cases.5 Judge Samuel Alito, however, Bush’s
next selection for the Court, had expressed hostility towards many
of the assertions of Congressional power that we have grown accustomed to since the 1930s in his position on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.6 Since Justice Alito is now a member of
the Supreme Court, only time will tell if a new Court majority will
coalesce to police strictly the boundaries of federalism.
In truth, the Court’s federalism jurisprudence was in flux even
before the recent personnel changes. In the 1990s, the Supreme
3. 334 F.3d 1158 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
4. Id. at 1160. Chief Justice Roberts explained in his Senate confirmation hearings that “I thought, if there was another basis for sustaining the Endangered Species
Act that was not inconsistent in the view of another Circuit court, that we ought to look
at that and try to do it.” The Nomination of John Roberts to be Chief Justice of The
Supreme Court Before the S. Judiciary Comm. 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of John
G. Roberts, Chief Justice Nominee), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2005/09/13/AR2005091301469.html.
5. But see John C. Eastman, The End of Federalism, The Claremont Institute —
Writings, ¶ 4 (Oct. 24, 2005), http://www.claremont.org/writings/051024eastman.
html (speculating that Harriet Miers’s nomination was a signal that “[t]he era of ‘big
government is over’ was over”).
6. See, e.g., United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 522
U.S. 807 (1997) (Alito, J., dissenting) (voting to invalidate a federal law banning machine guns on the grounds that it exceeded Congress’s Commerce Clause powers);
Chittister v. Dep’t of Cmty. & Econ. Dev., 226 F.3d 223 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that
Congress did not validly abrogate state sovereign immunity in enacting the Family Medical Leave Act because the statute exceeded Congress’s power under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
Indeed, Judge Alito was a champion of restricting Congress’s power in the name of
federalism even before he was appointed to the bench. In 1986, he authored a memo
urging President Reagan to veto a federal bill requiring used-car dealers to keep track
of the mileage of cars on the grounds that the law would infringe upon states’ rights.
Alito wrote that “the federal government should not intervene in matters that traditionally have been the responsibility of the states, and in which there is no overriding need
for national policy uniformity. Appropriately, the licensing and transfer of automobiles
have been a matter of state concern since the inception of motor travel.” Charles Hurt,
Alito papers evince a conservative, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2005, at A14. President Reagan
signed the legislation. Id.
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Court engaged in a Federalism Revolution — taking upon itself the
task of ensuring that the national legislature did not encroach upon
the proper authority of the states.7 In more recent years, however,
the strong rhetoric that the Court used in those cases has faded
away and has been replaced by much more cautious, perhaps even
counter-Revolutionary, language. For example, this past term in
Gonzales v. Raich,8 the Court not only passed up an opportunity to
further reduce the scope of Congress’s powers, but Justice Scalia —
usually a reliable vote to trim Congress’s wings — concurred separately to emphasize the expansive reach of Congress’s powers under
the Commerce and the Necessary and Proper Clauses: “[w]here
necessary to make a regulation of interstate commerce effective,
Congress may regulate even those intrastate activities that do not
themselves substantially affect interstate commerce.”9 Moreover,
the Gonzales decision is hardly an anomaly. Since 2003, in cases
dealing with the Commerce Clause,10 Section 5 of the Fourteenth
7. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 187 (1992) (“Much of the Constitution is concerned with setting forth the form of our government, and the courts have
traditionally invalidated measures deviating from that form.”) (emphasis added). The
cases of the Federalism Revolution also include: United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549
(1995); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S.
507 (1997); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary
Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S.
706 (1999); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598 (2000); Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000); Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett,
531 U.S. 356 (2001); Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002).
For stories describing the impact of the Federalism Revolution on the lives of
Americans, see AWAKENING FROM THE DREAM: CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER SIEGE AND THE NEW
STRUGGLE FOR EQUAL JUSTICE (Denise C. Morgan et al. eds., 2005).
8. 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005) (holding that Congress has the Commerce Clause
power to criminalize the noncommercial use of medical marijuana under the federal
Controlled Substances Act).
9. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2216 (Scalia, J., concurring). Indeed, Justice Scalia would
also have loosened the economic activities tests even more than the majority did. His
concurring opinion asserted that “Congress may regulate even noneconomic local activity if that regulation is a necessary part of a more general regulation of interstate commerce.” Id. at 2217.
10. See Pierce County v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129 (2003) (holding that a federal law
regulating highway safety — as well as a collateral evidentiary matter in state court proceedings — did not violate Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause). Cf.
Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 916-23 (2006) (holding that the U.S. Attorney General’s interpretative rule — that Oregon physicians who assisted suicides in accordance
with Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act (ODWDA) would do so in violation of the federal
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Amendment,11 the Spending Clause,12 and the Eleventh Amendment,13 the Court has firmly held a confused (perhaps even inconsistent) line — refusing both to definitively strip Congress of
substantial authority to regulate the states or to create individual
rights that are enforceable against the states.
Even this apparent reversal of fortunes is uncertain. While
commentators have both hailed and assailed the Court’s counterRevolution cases as the end of an era,14 those decisions have left
ample room for lower federal and state court judges acting in good
faith to expand or restrict the scope of Congressional power. For
example, both Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs 15 and
government’s Controlled Substances Act (CSA) — was an invalid exercise of federal
Commerce Clause regulatory power); Granholm v. Heald, 125 S. Ct. 1885 (2005) (holding that state laws regulating out-of-state wineries violated the Dormant Commerce
Clause). The Court had earlier signaled its ambivalence about restricting the commerce power when it decided Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000) (holding that a
federal law barring a state’s disclosure of personal information relating to their licensed
drivers without the consent of affected drivers was a valid exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause authority). The Court may decide another important Commerce Clause
issue this term, see Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 414 (2005) (granting certiorari
to decide whether the application of the Clean Water Act to the wetlands in this case is
within Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause); Carabell v. United States
Army Corps of Eng’rs, 126 S. Ct. 415 (2005) (granting certriorari to decide the same
question at issue in Rapanos).
11. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004) (holding that Eleventh Amendment
did not bar suit against the state to recover damages for violation of Title II of the ADA
in cases involving access to the courts); Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S.
721 (2003) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar suit by state employee
to recover damages for violation of the FMLA family-care leave provision).
12. Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600 (2004) (holding that 18 U.S.C.
§ 666(a)(2) was a valid exercise of Congress’s authority under the Spending Clause).
13. Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 126 S. Ct. 990 (2006) (holding that a bankruptcy
trustee’s proceeding to set aside the debtor’s preferential transfers to state agencies was
not barred by the Eleventh Amendment); Tennessee v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440 (2004)
(holding that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar suit against a state governmental
corporation for the discharge of student loans).
14. See Linda Greenhouse, The Rehnquist Court and Its Imperiled States’ Rights Legacy,
N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2005, § 4 (Week in Review), at 3 (stating that “what had seemed
until very recently to be a legacy in the making now appears evanescent, perhaps even
illusory,” and quoting Michael Greve of the American Enterprise Institute as saying that
“[t]he federalism boomlet has fizzled”); Editorial, Review and Outlook: High on the Commerce Clause, WALL ST. J., June 8, 2005, at A14 (“Justices Scalia and Anthony Kennedy . . .
appear to have retreated from putting any restraint on Commerce Clause-based
regulation.”).
15. 538 U.S. 721 (holding that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suit by state
employee to recover damages for violation of the FMLA family-care leave provision).
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Tennessee v. Lane,16 two counter-Revolution cases, have been distinguished more than they have been extended in the lower federal
and state courts — so that plaintiffs continue to be prevented from
asserting claims against the states under the Family Medical Leave
Act (FMLA) and Title II of the Americans With Disabilities Act
(ADA).17 Moreover, both lawyers and judges are taking full advan16. 541 U.S. 509 (holding that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suit against
the state to recover damages for violation of Title II of the ADA in cases involving access
to the courts).
17. For examples of courts that have declined to extend Hibbs and holding that
Congress did not validly abrogate state sovereign immunity in enacting FMLA provisions which allowed leave because of the employee’s own health condition, see Touvell
v. Ohio Dep’t of Mental Retardation & Dev. Disabilities, 422 F.3d 392 (6th Cir. 2005);
Brockman v. Wyo. Dep’t of Family Servs., 342 F.3d 1159 (10th Cir. 2003); Bryant v. Miss.
State Univ., 329 F. Supp.2d 818 (N.D. Miss. 2004); Lizzi v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit
Auth., 862 A.2d 1017 (Md. 2004). But see Malone v. Shenandoah County Dep’t of Soc.
Servs., 2005 WL 1902857 (W.D. Va. Aug. 9, 2005) (holding that the FMLA retaliation
provisions, when used in conjunction with the childbirth provision, validly abrogate
state sovereign immunity); Toeller v. Wis. Dep’t of Corr., 390 F. Supp.2d 792 (E.D. Wis.
2005) (holding that Congress validly abrogated state sovereign immunity in enacting
FMLA self-care provisions).
For examples of courts declining to extend Lane, see Bill M. ex rel. William M. v.
Neb. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. Fin. & Support, 408 F.3d 1096, 1100 (8th Cir.
2005) (holding that Title II of the ADA does not validly abrogate state sovereign immunity as applied to state’s refusal to fund home- and community-based Medicaid-funded
services); Miller v. King, 384 F.3d 1248, 1275-76 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that Title II
of the ADA does not validly abrogate state sovereign immunity in the prison context);
Press v. State Univ. of N.Y., 388 F. Supp.2d 127 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding that Title II of
the ADA does not validly abrogate state sovereign immunity as applied to university’s
denial of access to post-secondary education because access to education is not a fundamental right); Buchanan v. Maine, 377 F. Supp.2d 276 (D. Me. 2005) (holding that
Title II of the ADA does not validly abrogate state sovereign immunity as applied to
access to public mental health services); Johnson v. S. Conn. State Univ., 2004 WL
2377225 (D. Conn. Sept. 30, 2004) (holding that Title II of the ADA does not validly
abrogate state sovereign immunity because access to higher education is not a fundamental right); Haas v. Quest Recovery Serv., Inc., 338 F. Supp.2d 797 (N.D. Ohio 2004)
(holding that Title II of the ADA does not validly abrogate state sovereign immunity as
applied to claim that drug treatment facility did not accommodate paraplegic’s disability); Simmang v. Tex. Bd. of Law Exam’r, 346 F. Supp.2d 874, 881–83 (W.D. Tex. 2004)
(holding that Title II of the ADA does not validly abrogate state sovereign immunity as
applied to cases involving refusal to provide double time for the bar exam); Roe v.
Johnson, 334 F. Supp.2d 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding that Title II of the ADA does not
validly abrogate state sovereign immunity as applied to cases challenging a state’s decisions concerning an applicant’s admission to the bar); McNulty v. Bd. of Educ., 2004
WL 1554401 (D. Md. July 8, 2004) (holding that Title II of the ADA does not validly
abrogate state sovereign immunity as applied to education claims). But see Constantine
v. Rectors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 490 (4th Cir. 2005) (holding that Title
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tage of the leeway created by the Federalism Revolution to think
creatively about what Congressional authority should be.18
With federalism jurisprudence in such an unsettled state, and
with the Supreme Court accepting certiorari on and deciding only
about 80 of the more than 27,000 cases that were terminated on the
merits by twelve circuit courts and the more than 26,000 cases decided by the highest courts of the states in recent years,19 it is the
lower federal courts that most often have the last word on the scope
of Congress’s powers. Given that Republican Presidents committed
to shrinking the federal government appointed the majority of the
judges in ten of the thirteen circuits,20 it is likely that as long as
those judges continue to dominate the federal bench, the echoes of
the Federalism Revolution (more than the echoes of the counterRevolution) will continue to reverberate in the lower federal courts.
Finally, the unsettled state of the Court’s preemption doctrine
only adds more confusion to the already muddy picture of Revolution and counter-Revolution. One might expect a Court concerned
about states’ rights to be particularly attentive to minimizing the
II of the ADA abrogates state sovereign immunity as applied to cases involving the administration of higher education); Ass’n for Disabled Ams. v. Fla. Int’l Univ., 405 F.3d
954 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that Title II of the ADA abrogates state sovereign immunity as applied to access to public education claims); Phiffer v. Colum. River Corr. Inst.,
384 F.3d 791 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that Title II of the ADA abrogates state sovereign
immunity as applied to claim that state failed to accommodate plaintiff’s osteoarthritis
and osteoporosis); Badillo-Santiago v. Naveira-Merly, 378 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2004) (holding that Title II of the ADA abrogates state sovereign immunity as applied to claim that
plaintiff was denied reasonable accommodation for his hearing impairment during
trial).
18. See, e.g., Westside Mothers v. Haveman, 133 F. Supp.2d 549, 561 (E.D. Mich.
2001) (finding that Spending Clause legislation is a mere contract that is not the “supreme law of the land,” and, therefore, could not be enforced pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§1983). The district court’s rationale was subsequently rejected by the Sixth Circuit.
Westside Mothers v. Haveman, 289 F.3d 852 (6th Cir. 2002).
19. See The Supreme Court, 2004 Term: The Statistics, 119 HARV. L. REV. 415, 426
(2005); Leonidas Mecham, Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Judicial Business of the
United States Courts: 2004 Annual Report of the Director Table S-1 (2005), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2004/tables/s1.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2006); Shauna
M. Strickland, Nat’l Ctr. for State Courts, State Court Caseload Statistics Table 1 (2004),
available at http://www.ncsconline.org/D_Research/csp/2004_Files/SCCSTables%
201-4.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2006).
20. See Alliance for Justice, Federal Judiciary by Court and Appointing President,
http://www.allianceforjustice.org/judicial/judicial_selection_resources/selection_
database/byCourtAndAppPres.asp (last visited Feb. 20, 2006).
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preemptive effects of federal statutes. That was not the case, however, with the Rehnquist Court.21 Indeed, that Court strengthened
preemption doctrine by encouraging strict textual (as opposed to
contextual) determination of Congressional intent,22 narrowly
reading savings clauses in preemption provisions,23 showing increased concern that the response of businesses to the risk of liability under state common law actions would affect federal regulatory
schemes,24 and evincing little concern for states’ ability to regulate
their traditional areas of concern.25 The combination of those
21. See, e.g., Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246
(2004); Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 421 (2003); Lorrilard Tobacco Co. v.
Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001); Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141 (2001); Buckman Co. v.
Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341 (2001); Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council,
530 U.S. 363 (2000); Geier v. Am. Honda Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000); Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v.
Shanklin, 529 U.S. 344 (2000); United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89 (2000). But see Bates
v. Dow Agrosciences, 125 S. Ct. 1788 (2005) (holding that FIFRA does not preempt
claims for defective design, defective manufacture, negligent testing, breach of express
warranty, and violation of Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act); Rush Prudential HMO,
Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355 (2002) (holding that ERISA does not preempt the Illinois
HMO Act). See also Granholm, 125 S. Ct. 1885 (holding that state laws regulating out-ofstate wineries violate the Dormant Commerce Clause).
22. See Engine Mfrs. Ass’n 541 U.S. at 255 (“In addition to having no basis in the
text of the statute, treating sales restrictions and purchase restrictions differently for
pre-emption purposes would make no sense.”); Lorrilard Tobacco Co., 533 U.S. at 595
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Ripped from its context, this provision could theoretically be
read as a breathtaking expansion of the limitations imposed by the 1965 Act. However,
both our precedents and common sense require us to read statutory provisions — and
in particular, pre-emption clauses — in the context of both their neighboring provisions and of the history and purpose of the statutory scheme.”). But see Geier 529 U.S. at
912 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[N]either the text of the statute not the text of the regulation contains any indication of an intent to pre-empt.”).
23. See Geier, 529 U.S. at 869 (“[T]he savings clause . . . does not bar the ordinary
working of conflict pre-emption principles.”); Locke, 529 U.S. at 106 (“We decline to
give broad effect to saving clauses where doing so would upset the careful regulatory
scheme established by federal law.”).
24. See Buckman Co., 531 U.S. at 348 (“The balance sought by the [FDA] can be
skewed by allowing fraud-on-the-FDA claims under state tort law.”); Geier, 529 U.S. at
871 (“[T]he rules of law that judges and juries create or apply in [common law tort]
suits may themselves similarly create uncertainty and even conflict, say, when different
juries in different States reach different decisions on similar facts.”); Norfolk S. Ry. Co.,
529 U.S. at 358 (“What States cannot do — once they have installed federally funded
devices at a particular crossing — is hold the railroad responsible for the adequacy of
those devices.”).
25. See Lorrilard Tobacco Co., 533 U.S. at 591 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“As the regulations at issue in this suit implicate two powers that lie at the heart of the States’ traditional police power — the power to regulate land usage and the power to protect the
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cases and the Federalism Revolution curtailed Congress’s powers to
protect individual rights in the name of federalism, while cutting
back the states’ powers to protect individual rights in the interest of
respecting Congress’s proper sphere of operation — creating an
anti-regulatory void.26 The result has been the inhibition of private
litigation aimed at promoting the accountability of government and
business.27
Between the turnover of Supreme Court justices, the conflict
between the Court’s Federalism Revolution and counter-Revolution
cases, and the doctrinal tension inherent in weakening affirmative
Congressional powers while strengthening preemption jurisprudence, a Federal Courts scholar could be forgiven for asking in exasperation, “What on earth is going on?”
I do not pretend to have an answer to that question — and
indeed, I strongly suspect that none of the individual Justices has an
answer either. It is not a judge’s job “to decide cases in a way that
health and safety of minors — our precedents require that the Court construe the preemption provision ‘narrow[ly].’”); Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 151 (“[We] have not hesitated to
find state family law pre-empted when it conflicts with ERISA or relates to ERISA
plans.”).
In contrast, the Court has been hostile toward state laws that touch on areas of
traditional federal concern, such as maritime law and foreign affairs. See Garamendi,
539 U.S. at 421 (applying foreign affairs preemption: “The exercise of the federal executive authority means that state law must give way where, as here, there is evidence of
clear conflict between the policies adopted by the two”); Crosby, 530 U.S. at 381 (creating Executive authority preemption: “This clear mandate and invocation of exclusively
national power belies any suggestion that Congress intended the President’s effective
voice to be obscured by state or local action”); Locke, 529 U.S. at 99 (expanding the
notion of field preemption: “The State of Washington has enacted legislation in an area
where the federal interest has been manifest since the beginning of our Republic and is
now well established”).
26. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The “Conservative” Paths of the Rehnquist Court’s Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429 (2002) (describing both halves of the regulatory
void); Denise C. Morgan & Rebecca E. Zietlow, The New Parity Debate: Congress and Rights
of Belonging, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 1347 (2005) (arguing that state law cannot replace federal civil rights legislation); Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, 83
TEX. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (2004) (also describing both halves of the regulatory void).
27. See David Barron, Reclaiming Federalism, DISSENT MAGAZINE, Spring 2005, available at http://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/?article=249 (“[T]he Court consistently
decides against ‘overreaching’ by states and localities and legitimates business-backed
federal efforts to curb state and local regulations.”); Vicki C. Jackson, Seductions of Coherence, State Sovereign Immunity, and the Denationalization of Federal Law, 31 RUTGERS L.J.
691, 706 (2000) (describing the Court as “opposed to civil litigation, both in general
and as a tool of government accountability and law reform”).
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establishes broad rules for the future and that also gives deep theoretical justifications for outcomes,” but rather to decide one case at
a time based on the specific facts before him or her.28 Still, those of
us who earn our living trying to draw straight lines through judicial
meanderings like to believe that there is some order in the workings
of our highest court.
The first four pieces in this volume, which were presented at
the Federal Courts section panel at the 2005 AALS convention, ask
some version of the Federal Courts scholar’s distressed query. My
colleague, Professor Edward A. Purcell, Jr., opens the volume by
putting that question into a broader historical and theoretical context. His article asks:
[W]hether, and to what extent, it is possible for “federalism” to serve as a meaningful and independent norm in
the nation’s constitutional enterprise. In other words, are
the provisions of the Constitution that establish the federal structure, sufficiently clear, specific, and complete to
direct those who construe them to “correct” decisions or,
at least, to eliminate wide ranges of discretion in such decision making?29

Can an examination of history set us on the proper path prescribed
by the Constitution, or, when it comes to American federalism, are
we condemned to muddle through, always wondering, “What on
earth is going on?”
Professor Purcell’s interrogation provides some lessons and
yields some insights into the “true” nature of American federalism,
but more fundamentally, it “reveal[s] disagreement, uncertainty,
conflict, and change.”30 Indeed, he contends that federalism has
been, remains, and always will be a contested issue, in part because
“[s]ome of our most basic conceptions and assumptions about the
federal system have changed substantially over the years.”31 In
sharp contrast to the work of Federal Courts scholars who pro28. Cass Sunstein, Foreward: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 15
(1996).
29. Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Evolving Understandings of American Federalism: Some Shifting Parameters, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 635, 637 (2005-2006).
30. Id. at 635.
31. Id. at 637.
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pound clear cut prescriptive theories of federalism,32 Professor Purcell concludes that “the idea of ‘constitutional federalism’ — that
is, federalism as a directive constitutional norm — [is] deeply
problematic.”33
Each of the sections of Professor Purcell’s article examines one
of the moving parts of American federalism: our ideas about the
proper role of the Supreme Court in the federal system; our ideas
about the values of federalism; our understanding of the nature of
federalism as a structure of government; and our ideas about the
nature and meaning of the Constitution itself. He finds that even
the founding generations had at least five conflicting ideas about
the appropriate role of the Supreme Court and judicial review.
Moreover, “[a]lthough the five views were distinct, they were also
frequently intermixed in the minds of the founders.”34 Professor
Purcell traces those different understandings of the Court’s proper
function from the ante-bellum period to the modern era — and
attributes our failure to settle on one dominant conception to the
fact that “[n]either the Constitution nor any other authoritative
source unequivocally defined such a system or such a role.”35
Professor Purcell contends that discussions of the values of federalism — “usually described as including protecting liberty, encouraging diversity and innovation, ensuring political
accountability, promoting democratic participation, and protecting
local values and interests” — are similarly unhelpful in identifying
clear lines between state and federal authority.36 Indeed, he asserts
32. See RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS’ DESIGN 15 (1987) (“For a
‘proper understanding’ of federalism . . . we must look to the explanations of the Founders, what is characterized as the ‘original intention.’”); Antonin Scalia, Common-Law
Courts in a Civil-Law System, in A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law 3,
45 (1997) (“Often — indeed, I dare say usually — [the original meaning of the constitution] is easy to discern and simple to apply.”); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a
Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1177-79 (1989) (discussing the “advantage[s] of
establishing as soon as possible a clear, general principle of decision” and urging judges
to write decisions that establish broad discretion-constraining rules of law). See also Morrison, 529 U.S. at 616-18 (“The Constitution requires a distinction between what is truly
national and what is truly local.”).
33. Purcell, supra note 29, at 697.
34. Id. at 643.
35. Id. at 663.
36. Id. at 663, n. 121.
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that those conversations, which began to proliferate in the late
twentieth century, were driven by
an anxious sense that many “traditional” lines ostensibly
separating national and state power were no longer
sound, easily detectable, or even operationally plausible.
Some kind of functional analysis seemed necessary to justify the existence of the states as independent governing
units, to assure Americans that those state governments
actually produced public benefits, and to identify useful
and intelligible lines that could be drawn between federal
and state authority.37

Professor Purcell offers as an example the fact that the notion that
states should serve as laboratories of democracy does nothing to
distinguish between those social experiments that the Constitution
permits and those that it prohibits.
Professor Purcell next argues that the national conception of
federalism as a structure of government has evolved over time. He
points out that the founding generation did not have much of a
choice about adopting a federalist structure — given the political
reality of the states, federalism was “a working compromise necessary to allow [them] to forge a new and more ‘energetic’ central
government.”38 Professor Purcell contends that different theories
of federalism, like dual federalism, cooperative federalism, and
competitive federalism, have emerged over time “from the
processes of social change and reflected the ideas, values, and challenges of new generations confronting new historical contexts and
new political alignments.”39 As such, no one theory can claim
greater constitutional legitimacy than any other.
The piece ends with an examination of our changing ideas
about the Constitution and constitutional interpretation. Professor
Purcell contends that our search for a clear, stable understanding
of that document has been frustrated.
The rise and spread of utilitarianism, naturalism, positivism, and relativism undermined many traditional legal
and moral ideas. At the same time, philosophical skepti37.
38.
39.

Id. at 664.
Id. at 683.
Id. at 689.
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cism, pragmatism, cognitive indeterminism, and later
‘postmodernism’ deepened doubts about the human capacity to know while highlighting the seemingly infinite
malleability of words, sounds, symbols, and images.40

This section critiques originalism as a method of constitutional interpretation on methodological and pragmatic grounds. Moreover,
Professor Purcell contends that “[b]eyond those analytic problems
. . . loom[s] the embarrassing fact that, as a practical political matter, originalist theories were used primarily as purposeful instruments of constitutional change and doctrinal innovation.
Originalism was the natural tool of those who sought justifications
for overthrowing existing doctrines, precedents, and practices.”41
Seemingly resigned to the “incomplete, ambiguous, and ambivalent
nature of American constitutional federalism” and the inevitability
of historical change, Professor Purcell concludes that federalism
will continue to be contested — and that we will have to look elsewhere for the clarity that we seek.
Professor Lynn Baker’s piece, The Future of Federalism?: Pierce
County v. Guillen as a Case Study, uses the Supreme Court’s decision in Pierce County v. Guillen 42 as a jumping-off point in her attempt to make sense of the Court’s recent Spending Clause
jurisprudence.43 The Spending Clause gives Congress its most substantial powers to impinge upon state autonomy, and South Dakota
v. Dole gives Congress considerable leeway in conditioning federal
spending on state compliance with federal regulations.44 But, despite the fact that the broad scope of Congress’s Spending Clause
authority “does not provide Congress an eternally available means
of circumventing those limitations on Congress’s other Article I
powers that the Court has recognized,” the Court has yet to attempt
to more strictly police that power.45 The Guillen case, in which the
Supreme Court of Washington struck down a federal statute that
conditioned the states’ receipt of federal highway safety monies
40. Id. at 691.
41. Id. at 694.
42. 537 U.S. 129.
43. See Baker, supra note 2.
44. 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (holding that encouragement to state action is a valid use
of the spending power).
45. Baker, supra note 2, at 703.
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upon their agreement to shield certain accident reports and highway safety data from discovery and introduction into evidence in
state court proceedings, offered the Court an opportunity to bring
its Spending Clause jurisprudence more in line with its Commerce
Clause and Section 5 case law.46 Professor Baker’s article asks the
question: “Why did the States’ Rights Five forego this rare opportunity to strengthen or re-affirm the significance of existing spending
power doctrine which is so central to any meaningful ‘federalist
revival?’”47
The Guillen case is indeed intriguing. As Professor Baker
points out, “each member of the States’ Rights Five was on record
as having been willing to invalidate a federal statute under the doctrine set out in Dole.”48 Indeed, the amicus brief Professor Baker
and her colleague Mitch Berman submitted in the case argued that
the statute violated both the Spending and Commerce Clauses.49
Given the Federalism Revolution, it seemed to her a slam dunk that
the Court would use the opportunity presented by the Guillen case
to further trim Congressional authority.50 The Court, however,
unanimously upheld the federal statute under the Commerce
Clause and chose not to reach the Spending Clause issue.51
Professor Baker attributes the Guillen decision to the fact that
the Justices employed categorical federalism,52 attempting to discern whether the core activity at issue was a traditional and appropriate area of federal or state regulation.53 Indeed, she contends
that “the recent Commerce Clause jurisprudence of the States’
Rights Five, like their spending power jurisprudence, is driven by a
(sometimes) unstated inquiry into whether the federal statute
would regulate an area ‘where States historically have been sovereign,’ or whether it instead involves a traditional and appropriate
federal function.”54 Since the Court viewed the Guillen statute as
46. See id. at 699-701.
47. Id. at 708.
48. Id. at 709.
49. See id. at 704-08.
50. Id. at 705.
51. Guillen, 537 U.S. at 146-48.
52. See Judith Resnik, Categorical Federalism: Jurisdiction, Gender and the Globe, 111
YALE L.J. 619 (2001).
53. Baker, supra note 2, at 709.
54. Id. at 712.
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regulating highway safety — an area traditionally regulated by the
federal government — and not state court rules of evidence, it upheld the statute under the Commerce Clause.55 In closing, Professor Baker notes the irony of the fact that the Court appears to have
revived sub rosa the late Justice Rehnquist’s traditional function test
from National League of Cities v. Usery 56 that the Court subsequently
declared unworkable in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority.57
Professors Jesse Choper and John Yoo, in Effective Alternatives to
Causes of Action Barred by the Eleventh Amendment, also express puzzlement with the Court’s Federalism Revolution. Focusing on the
Court’s recent sovereign immunity jurisprudence, which has inhibited Congress from holding states liable for violations of federal law
through private damages actions, the authors ask “why the Rehnquist Court would devote substantial resources toward developing a
line of cases that pose[s] no serious barriers to Congress, while at
the same time depriving individuals of full vindication of their constitutional or statutory rights.”58
Choper and Yoo open their piece with the contention that
scholarly criticism of the Court’s line of sovereign immunity decisions that began with Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida 59 has been
“vastly exaggerated.”60 Indeed, the authors argue that there are
enough “internal” and “external” constraints on state sovereign immunity that the Court’s decisions “establish no serious barrier to a
Congress and President intent on achieving national policy objectives.”61 Among the internal constraints — those created by Eleventh Amendment doctrine — Choper and Yoo list the availability
of Ex Parte Young proceedings for prospective injunctive relief
against state officers who violate federal law; retrospective damage
suits against state officers in their private capacities; section 1983
55. Id. at 713.
56. 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976) (Congress may not “directly displace the States’ freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions”),
overruled, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
57. Id. at 714.
58. Jesse H. Choper & John C. Yoo, Effective Alternatives to Causes of Action Barred by
the Eleventh Amendment, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 715, 727 (2005-2006).
59. 517 U.S. 44.
60. Choper & Yoo, supra note 58, at 715.
61. Id. at 715-16.
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damages suits against state officials for violations of federal statutory
or constitutional rights; suits brought against the states by the
United States; and suits brought to enforce legislation enacted pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.62 Among the
external constraints on state sovereign immunity — those that are
independent of the Court’s sovereign immunity jurisprudence —
the authors cite Congress’s ability to evade state sovereign immunity doctrine by regulating the states though Spending Clause legislation; Congress’s authority to use its treatymaking power to
override state sovereign immunity; and the availability of non-federal alternatives like state regulatory schemes or state common law
that provide remedies for violations of federal law by state
officers.63
Their conclusion that the Court’s sovereign immunity jurisprudence does not substantially inhibit Congress or protect states’
rights only piques Choper and Yoo’s curiosity about the Court’s intentions. They are not terribly concerned that the Seminole Tribe
line of cases will “depriv[e] individuals of full vindication of their
constitutional or statutory rights” because they think that the federal government’s ability to achieve national policy objectives
should be the primary focus of the Eleventh Amendment cases.64
Choper and Yoo do, however, appear troubled that the Court’s sovereign immunity decisions have the “[potential to] concentrate
greater law enforcement discretion in the hands of the Executive
branch.”65 They explain that “[i]f the United States can successfully override sovereign immunity by itself suing the states, as the
Court has concluded, then the applicability of the Eleventh Amendment hinges first on action by Congress, and then on the decisions
of the President and the relevant agencies, rather than the choices
of private parties.”66
Professor Erwin Chemerinsky’s contribution, Reconceptualizing
Federalism, contains both a critical component — questioning the
coherence of the Supreme Court’s past fifteen years of federalism
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

See
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

id. at 720-27.
at 723-26.
at 727.
at 727-28.
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jurisprudence — and a constructive component — proposing an
alternative vision of federalism that would
be based on open and express attention to, and where
necessary a balancing of, to how to best advance liberty
and enhance effective governance. Generally, this will require the Court to abandon its use of federalism as a judicial limit on federal or state authority and to instead to
use it to uphold the power of each level of government to
deal with social problems.67

His alternative vision should, perhaps, be called “empowerment
federalism.”
Chemerinsky begins by providing a political and historical context for the Court’s Federalism Revolution.68 He argues that while
there is nothing inherent in federalism that makes it conservative,
“throughout American history, and especially in the 1990s, federalism has been used by conservatives as a way of trying to limit government power. In other words, conservatives have used federalism as
a procedural way of blocking substantive reforms with which they
disagree.”69 The Court’s invocation of states’ rights in its Federalism Revolution cases is highly formalistic, Chemerinsky notes, because those cases have “consistently invalidated highly desirable
social legislation without serving the underlying goals of federalism.”70 For example, Chemerinsky asserts that the Gun Free Zone
Act that the Court struck down in United States v. Lopez,71 the civil
rights remedy in the Violence Against Women Act that the Court
struck down in United States v. Morrison,72 and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act that the Court struck down in City of Boerne v.
Flores 73 were all beneficial pieces of legislation.74 In addition, he
argues that “[t]he values traditionally invoked to justify federalism
— states are closer to the people, states serve as a barrier to tyranny
67. Erwin Chemerinsky, Reconceptualizing Federalism, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 729,
731 (2005-2006).
68. See id. at 732-36.
69. Id. at 735.
70. Id. at 736.
71. 514 U.S. 549.
72. 529 U.S. 598.
73. 521 U.S. 507.
74. Chemerinsky, supra note 67, at 736-38.
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by the federal government, states are laboratories for experimentation — have virtually nothing to do with the Court’s decisions and,
on reflection, are of little use in constitutional decisionmaking.”75
Indeed, Chemerinsky argues that the Court spends a disproportionate amount of energy and attention on one half of the federalism
equation: protecting state governments; and entirely too little energy and attention on the other half of the equation: “safeguarding
the federal government and the supremacy of federal law.”76 The
Court did not even consider that concern in its recent sovereign
immunity jurisprudence.
Chemerinsky argues, moreover, that the Court’s asserted concern with federalism and states’ rights is inconsistent with its case
law involving federal preemption of state laws.77 He notes that
“over the last several years, the Supreme Court repeatedly has
found preemption of important state laws, even when federal law
was silent about preemption or explicitly preserved state laws.”78
He cites Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 79 Lorillard Tobacco Co. v.
Reilly,80 Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council,81 and American Insurance Association v. Garamendi 82 as examples of the Court’s invocation
of a presumption in favor of preemption that is at odds with the
Court’s stated desire to exercise deference to the states.83
It is a brave task to propose a constructive project in a field that
is so deeply in flux, but Chemerinsky rises to the challenge. He
ends with a sketch of an alternative view of federalism that focuses
on creating effective government, not on limiting government authority.84 Specifically, he contends that “[c]onstitutional doctrines
about federalism should focus on how to empower each level of
government with the necessary authority to deal with the complex
problems of the 21st century.”85 Chemerinsky asserts that at least
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 745.
Id.
See id. at 746.
Id.
529 U.S. 861.
533 U.S. 525.
530 U.S. 363.
539 U.S. 396.
See Chemerinsky, supra note 67, at 746-53.
See id. at 753-55.
Id. at 754.
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three benefits would flow from his reconceptualization of federalism.86 First, the limits of Congressional power would be policed
primarily by the political process and judicial protection of other
parts of the constitution, as had been the case under Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority;87 second, both federal and
state courts would be more easily accessible to individuals asserting
federal claims; and, third, a more limited preemption doctrine
would enhance the power of state and local government.88
Although not presented at the AALS convention, the first two
student contributions to this volume show that the search for coherence that is one of the central projects of federal courts scholarship
has appeal across the generations. Helena Lynch asks whether the
Alien Tort Statute (ATS),89 which confers federal jurisdiction to
hear suits brought by aliens for torts committed in violation of the
law of nations, also allows suits to be brought against those who are
complicit in or provide support to those who violate the law of nations.90 Lynch concludes that in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,91 such complicity claims should be
barred.92 She argues that
The aiding and abetting standard [that existed prior to
Sosa] ultimately fails, however, to satisfy the criteria to
constitute a cause of action under the ATS as set forth in
Sosa 93 . . . . As a result . . . complicit actors are essentially
untouchable under the ATS unless they are in direct control of the primary actors.94

Sarah Kroll-Rosenbaum offers a critical examination of the
proposed Marriage Protection Act (MPA), which would strip the
lower federal courts and the Supreme Court of jurisdiction over any
86. See id. at 754-55.
87. 469 U.S. at 552 (“State sovereign interests, then, are more properly protected
by procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the federal system than by judicially created limitations on federal power.”).
88. See Chemerinsky, supra note 67, at 754-55.
89. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
90. Helena Lynch, Liability for Torts in Violation of International Law: No Hook Under
Sosa for Secondary, Complicit Actors, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 757, 758 (2005-2006).
91. 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
92. Lynch, supra note 90, at 758.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 758.
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case challenging or interpreting the 1996 Defense of Marriage Act
(DOMA).95 Kroll-Rosenbaum first examines the two pieces of legislation in question.96 She finds that DOMA, which provides that no
state shall be required to recognize same-sex marriages performed
out-of-state, does little to change existing law.97 Historically, states
have been free to decline to recognize out-of-state marriages that
are inconsistent with their own policies.98 Given the limited legal
impact of DOMA, Congress could easily have concluded that the
MPA was unnecessary.99 Kroll-Rosenbaum contends that members
of Congress were driven to consider the MPA by their fear that federal courts will require all states to accept same-sex marriages.100 As
it is currently drafted, the legislation would not, however, bar all
same-sex marriage-related claims from the federal courts.101 KrollRosenbaum then argues that the MPA is unconstitutional.102 She
contends that even if Article III gives Congress the power to strip
the Supreme Court of jurisdiction over a category of constitutional
claims, and even if it also gives Congress the power to strip the
lower federal courts of jurisdiction over those claims, “Congress
does not have the constitutional authority to simultaneously strip
both the original jurisdiction of the lower federal courts and the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over DOMA-related
cases or controversies because constitutional rights are at stake.”103
Taken together, these essays aptly mark the character of federalism jurisprudence at the end of the Rehnquist Court and the beginning of the Roberts Court. That jurisprudence is unclear,
unsettled, and unstable. In spite of the acute analyses and revealing
insights that the symposium’s participants provide, none purports
to either identify a coherent doctrinal pattern in the Rehnquist
Court’s federalism decisions or explain the goals and values that
animated the States’s Rights Five. Indeed, if Professor Baker is cor95. Sarah Kroll-Rosenbaum, The Marriage Protection Act: A Lesson in Congressional
Over-Reaching, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 809, 811-12 (2005-2006).
96. See id. at 812-21.
97. Id. at 812.
98. See id. at 814-15.
99. See id. at 815.
100. See id. at 816.
101. See id. at 817-18.
102. See id. at 826-30.
103. Id. at 812.
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rect that some idea of “categorical federalism” undergirds Guillen
and perhaps some of the Court’s other decisions,104 then it seems
clear that the judicial choice between “categories” is largely, if not
wholly, arbitrary. The “categories,” in other words, are essentially
conclusory, and they cannot be taken to explain why the Court has
chosen to apply one instead of another. The authors suggest rather
convincingly, then, that the scope, nature, direction, and consequences of the Rehnquist Court’s Federalism Revolution lies entirely in the hands of the Roberts Court.

104.

See Baker, supra note 2, at 709-14.

